



Review: [Untitled]

Reviewed Work(s):

Les Origines de la Guerre du Rif by Germain Ayache

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problem. It is, however, questionable whether the Europeans would be able to use their strength in the Middle East to serve Arab interests and to act independently of US policy.

There has been much change both in the Arab world and in Europe since the book was compiled three years ago. Differences in opinion between the USA and Europe, particularly Britain, have resulted in a growing detachment of Europe from American policy, and the reliance of Europe on the Arabs for oil has greatly diminished, leaving the latter more dependent on the former than previously. These changes of fortune have however only confirmed the book's message. Euro-Arab cooperation continues to be of vital importance, not purely from an Eurocentric point of view but, more importantly, as a means of bringing the two areas closer together, in all spheres, for mutual benefit and for the cause of international peace through a position as intermediary between the two superpowers.

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ABDEL BARI ATWAN

LES ORIGINES DE LA GUERRE DU RIF. By GERMAIN AYACHE.
(Publications de la Sorbonne, Série Internationale, 19), Paris-Rabat, Publications de la Sorbonne & Societe Marocaine des Editeurs Reunis, 1981. pp.374. FF.85.00, DH.80.

The author of this important work is a historian of probity, with a deserved international reputation. At the same time his philosophical and ideological tradition is Marxist, unlike that of his reviewer. Although my own very strong and outspoken divergences of opinion with the book here under review by no means all necessarily stem from this ideological cornerstone in its author's approach, the stance which he takes in the work on a number of parallel and, to him, 'revolutionary' issues are quite sufficient to put me, in view of my own previous and extensive treatment of the subject (1), at the opposite end of the Rifian panorama. In brief, I did not like this book, and the reasons why will soon become apparent. It does, however, have a number of good points, even some very good ones, and to this end a resumé of its contents is now in order before my sustained critique begins.

Briefly, there is, first, an introduction, and then chapters on the 'Alawid Empire ('permanence of a state and formation of a people'), the foreign intervention, the French success, the problems of Spain, 'Abd al-Krim and his son Muhammad, the difficulty with Spain, the rupture, the example of Raysuni, the crossroads, and a conclusion -- which leads up to 1921 and the famous Rifian victory of Dahar Ubarran. The book was difficult to read and more so to review: it goes on and on and on, and is not divided into chapter sub-headings as neat as the chapter listing at the end might otherwise lead us to believe. Nor are the chapters even numbered.

Ayache sets the tone in the introduction, and the comparison on pp.13-14 between 'Abd al-Krim, on the one hand, and Mao and Ho Chi-Minh, on the other, seems both gratuitous and uncalled for.

Whatever else 'Abd al-Krim may have been, he was certainly no communist, and furthermore, in my own view, not a revolutionary at all, but a very successful reformer in the Islamic Salafiyya mould during the brief period (1921-26) of his wartime ascendancy in the Rif. By the same token, the Regular Rif Army was no 'people's army', but rather a small but well-trained fighting force, mostly from 'Abd al-Krim's own core tribe, the Aith Waryaghar (or 'Beni Ouriaghel'), while the accessory tribal levies came from all the other Rifian tribes as well. Militarily, of course, the Rif War was not a success, because 'Abd al-Krim lost in the end.

Now, comparisons are all very well, but the mere convergent fact of anti-colonialism does not seem sufficient to establish what Ayache wishes. It is now very fashionable among Franco-Moroccan scholars to debunk colonialist historiography and sociology, and rightly so -- but the tendency has gone too far, and it is high time for the pendulum to move back toward middle ground. In the first chapter, for example, Ayache provides an excessively one-sided view of the famous *makhzan-siba* argument as the linchpin of pre-Protectorate history (in favour of the *makhzan*, of course). Supporters of this approach, such as Ayache himself, Laroui and Pascon, seem either to deny the very existence of *siba* or to laugh it out of court. My whole field experience among Berber-speaking tribal groups makes me strenuously opposed to this view, though not necessarily for the reasons normally invoked by colonialism. Nor does Ayache give us any of the concept's many circumstantial nuances, some of which, as expressed by Michaux-Bellaire, Salmon, Doutté and others before the Protectorate was officially in place, were quite considerable -- for example, *na'iba* tribes, and *ṣaraf* tribes, with their 'in-again, out-again' basis as far as Makhzen control was concerned. In any case, if Ayache wishes to argue that all Moroccan tribesmen were under the actual, and not just nominal temporal, control of the sultan (the fact of spiritual control being generally accepted) -- even if only locally administered by their own *qa'ids* under sultanic decree -- it would thus seem incumbent upon him to produce a representative sample of their pre-Protectorate tax receipts, from the palace archives in Rabat, or elsewhere, to show precisely how many of them did actually pay taxes, and when. To most highland Berbers, *siba* -- which in the Rif was known by the neologism *ripublik* -- has always been viewed as a pre-Protectorate condition or reality by those who participated in it or by their descendants. As an anthropologist with a major interest in traditional Berber sociopolitical structure I cannot allow this crucially important aspect of the question rejected by the gratuitous observations of an Ayache or a Laroui without dispute.

In his second chapter, Ayache would have us believe that Moroccan nationalism developed not only in pre-'Alawid times but during the famous -- and from some readings, questionable -- 'maraboutic crisis' from the fifteenth to the seventeenth

century. In view of the fact that true nationalism in Europe is not generally regarded as having developed much before Napoleon, this whole argument appears not only questionable, but also rather like a question of historical projection backward for projection's sake: Ayache would like to infer that such nationalism existed, of course, as it is central to his argument, but he cannot prove it. Even Laroui, as evinced by the title of his book *Les origines du nationalisme marocain, 1830-1912* (Paris: François Maspéro, 1977), has not really tried to make a case for Moroccan nationalism prior to 1830 and the French invasion of Algeria. Ayache would have us believe that Moroccan nationalism was therefore the world's earliest variety -- which is a *priori* very hard to accept -- while the key term 'Origines' in the titles of both Ayache's and Laroui's books is enough to give most anthropologists, particularly those reared in the structuralist-functionalist tradition of Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard, grave cause for alarm. Malinowski, with good reason and as a reaction against Victorian excesses, rejected the 'origins concept' sixty years ago, and, to my knowledge, it has not reappeared since then -- though it would conceivably do so, greatly chastened, and with a new semi-historical face. Evidently no such rejection happened in the historical disciplines, a fact which, sadly perhaps, is something which keeps structuralist anthropology and certain blinkered visions of history -- in which only documents are regarded as valid sources and which is so marked in the work here under review -- very far apart indeed. This is a great pity.

I have no complaint whatsoever with Ayache's chapters about the beginnings of French/Spanish colonialism in Morocco, and I certainly concur with his observations about Lyautey, which cogently echo and support those of Julien in *Le Maroc face aux Impérialismes 1415-1956* (Paris: Editions Jeune Afrique, 1978). But when he comes to the Rif and the Rifians, his point of view and mine are poles apart. Here I would like to make some important clarifications with respect to some of my own earlier work. For example, with reference to murder and the pursuit of the feud in Rifian markets, Ayache says 'la thèse de Hart qui...fait du marche le havre de la paix, mais dans un monde livré partout ailleurs, par la loi même, à la vindicte et au massacre mutuel, n'est pas fondée. Qu'il fut chatiment social. Un châtement sévère allant jusqu'à ruiner le meurtrier et sa famille entière. Seule la peine capitale n'était pas en usage...' Perhaps so, though I think he overstates the matter; and in my book (*The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif*, pp.293-303) I was very careful to emphasize the *practical* limitations of the *ḥaqq* fine to murder in the market. On pp.113-4, the quotation from Spanish archival sources inciting Rifians to fight each other are far too glib, given seemingly out of context, and could not possibly account for the prevalence of feuds in areas as far away from the Plain of al-Ḥusaima as the Jbil Ḥmam (the Aith Waryaghar point of origin), the Aith Ammarth or the Igzinnayen. The argument, furthermore, that all the

bloodfeuding in the Rif was provoked externally by Spanish machinations among their own *pensionados de la isla* (the island of al-Ḥusaima), who were few in number and tenuous in influence, maybe ingenious, but it is also extremely flimsy and, in my view, completely erroneous. Granted that the evils of colonialism are many, this is, even so, simply too Machiavellian to be believed. What it amounts to is a kind of thesis that Every-Effect-Must-Have-An-External-Cause, which as an anthropological argument is little short of preposterous. It seems to be nothing more than an attempt to lay at the doors of colonialism all precolonial malfunctions in society, a simplistic and unacceptable point of view. It is high time that, much as we may all excoriate Lyautey, we stop flogging the dead horse of colonialism.

A much more important issue in this connection, however, is that although the term 'tribe' is liberally bandied about by Ayache, there is no discussion anywhere of Rifian *tribal structure*, even where one would expect to find it, in the chapter 'Le Rif et les Rifians'. No consideration whatever is devoted to what a Rifian tribe is with respect to its own internal structure and organization, or in external terms, with respect to those of its neighbours. There is no interest whatsoever in the segmentary or alliance organizations of the area at large, or in intra/inter-group relations of any sort. Indeed, the concept of segmentation -- one which is crucial -- is not even mentioned. It is only the tribal relationship to the *makhzan* which matters to Ayache (who is totally government-oriented, in any case), and he places far too much emphasis on either the good intentions of the former to perform services and hand over taxes to the latter or on the capacity of the latter to oblige them to do so. Once again, we are given no facts or figures.

As far as competitors for tribal allegiance are concerned, what is the point of comparing the pretender Bu Ḥmāra to the Russian pretender Pugatchev almost two centuries earlier? To attempt to establish possible connections with Russian history, or merely as a display of erudition? On the other hand, the insistence on Amzzyan as the first Rifian leader in 1909 is very good indeed and worthwhile. In the context of my own *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif*, geared, as it was, almost exclusively to that tribe, I could not do justice to this point; and I congratulate Ayache for having done so.

Later on, however, it is difficult to understand why Ayache is so insistent that the patronymic and clan name *al-Khaṭṭabī* -- as used both by the Qaḍī 'Abd al-Krim and his two sons, the elder of whom, Si Muḥammad, was to become the leader of the Rifian uprising -- was not derived from the patronymic of the 'rightly guided' caliph 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭab. The point, of course, is not whether or not it is true, but rather that it is locally held to be true, an anthropological nicety that Ayache once again fails to perceive. All my own Aith Waryaghar informants, in the early 1950s, were unanimous over the point that the name Aith Khattab was indeed so derived,

and that 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭab was therefore their ancestor. But then again, what Ayache so conspicuously lacks is the whole dimension of anthropological fieldwork -- to which, unlike a few other and younger historians of my acquaintance, he appears to be a total stranger.

In the next two chapters, 'Le Cadi Abdelkrim et son Fils Mohamed' and 'La Brouille avec l'Espagne', which are both very well researched, I have no complaints other than with Ayache's ever-present failure to consider the social context and background of the Rifian War in its entirety. The personalities and vicissitudes of the Dharwa n-Si 'Abd r-Krim (the 'Abd al-Krim family) are concentrated upon almost too singlemindedly -- and indeed in this particular domain we are presented with a virtual embarrassment of riches; but nowhere is their lineage of origin -- fundamental information for any structural anthropologist -- even identified. It happens to have been the I'abd r-krimen, four generations back from Si Muḥammad bin Si 'Abd al-Krim himself, of, or -- more likely -- incorporated into, the Aith Zara' of Ajdir of the clan of the Aith Yusuf w-'Ari. But Ayache, again, not being an anthropologist, has nothing to say about this. He can possibly not be blamed, however, for not tying them in, as some of my own informants did, with the more or less local *shurfa* of the Asht 'Aru 'Aisa clan of the Igzinnayen to the south of the Aith Waryaghar -- as another counter-tradition has it. He is, furthermore, not perhaps to be blamed either for his 'non-inside' views of Abd al-Krim's genealogy: my own information was that Si Muḥammad's mother was from the Imrabḍen clan of the Aith Waryaghar, the local group of resident *shurfa* (Hart 1976: 369-71), a piece of genealogical information which, adding to the overall puzzle, may not have been available to him.

Further errors include, *inter alia*, on p.233: 'Tafersit chez les Beni Touzine'. In no way could this be true, as these are two entirely different tribes, although the former do adjoin the latter to the east. On p.255, the discussion of the influence of the Qādī 'Abd al-Krim suggests it extended 'in two or three tribes'. It was in fact only in one: his own Aith Waryaghar, and more specifically among its lowlanders! One wonders, too, precisely how many tribes were loyal to Raysunī or were even under him, as on p.256 it is very clear that social banditry in the Jbala did not just start up at the turn of the century, but considerably earlier. Raysunī was merely the last and by far the most successful in a long series of Jbala bandits; one who was, furthermore, able to consolidate his power base to become the strongman of the North-Western Jbala.

Ayache's preference for Gallicized Arabic spellings constantly leads him to make errors of transcription: on p.301, for example, 'Boul-Cherif' should properly be 'Bu r-ḥrif'. More importantly, on pp.321-2, the mention of fifty delegates representing the 'five fractions' of the 'Beni Ouriaghel' may be all very well, but there is no additional notation about the crucial principle

of *khams khmas*, or 'five-fifths', its function and cohesion-promoting properties. In the Aith Waryaghar case, these were to divide up into five basic clan and superclan shares the *ḥaqq* fine that a murderer had to pay if he committed his murder in the market or on any path leading to or from it.(2) The critical point here is, of course, that many French investigators have seen fit to turn their backs on segmentary tribal theory as applied to North Africa -- an attitude with which I totally disagree.

As far as Ayache's final chapter is concerned, the fact of Rifian local patriotism is undeniable, but that of nationalism is not. The two are in no way synonymous. The argument for the latter is surprising in that nowhere does Ayache push for Rifian distinctiveness or originality vis-à-vis the rest of Morocco, simply because it does not suit his very tenuous argument that the Rif had been in the vanguard of Moroccan nationalism. To the contrary, 'Abd al-Krim and the Rifian War were to assume a tremendous symbolic importance for the real Moroccan nationalists who were to follow directly on their heels.

Ayache's work is also disappointing from another crucial point of view, that of its total lack of synthesis between history and sociology -- a distinct failure. As a social anthropologist, I hoped for something to strike a responsive chord and found none. But Peter Worsley and Carmele Lison, two anthropologists whose work I admire, should have the last words here. Worsley says (in *El Tercer Mundo una nueva fuerza en los asuntos internacionales*, Mexico, Madrid, Buenos Aires, Bogota: Sigle Veintiuno Editores, S.A., 6° Ed., 1978. p.274): "The present can only be properly understood in terms of the past. In fact, a good historian does a sociological analysis on the period which he is writing. 'Non-historical' sociology is false sociology -- or limited -- while non-sociological history is equivocal history". And now Lison: 'Frente al cadaver de la palabra escrita encuentra el antropólogo la riqueza inagotable de la palabra sonora, inmediata, que sale de los labios del informante...' (Carmele Lisón Telesana, *Antropología social y hermenéutica*, Mexico, Madrid, Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1982, p.130).

These two questions amount to different modes of the same thing, and more in sorrow than in anger, I pass them on to Germain Ayache, whose narrowly historical focus could never be confused with sociology, a major dimension which in his book is completely lacking. He has done a great deal of commendable work on showing us how the 'Abd al-Krim family, father and sons, stayed on supporting the Spanish cause in the Rif and in northern Morocco until the very end, in 1920 -- and no doubt future researchers will be able to profit from his labours -- but the main point about Si Muhammad, the son, is that he took charge only after the break occurred, a point which is made only at the end of this book, with the Rifian victory at Dahar Ubarran.

I am naturally as stirred as Ayache about the events of

1921, but I approach them from a totally different direction. In my view, 'Abd al-Krim, as a *qādi* (and after becoming a *mujāhid*) turned into a thorough-going reformer of what was previously a segmentary and tribally organized society, and not into a revolutionary, communist-style or any other. The Rif War was indeed a grassroots war, as any tribal revolt should *ipso facto* be, and I would certainly concede Ayache's notion of patriotism -- it would be pointless not to do so -- in terms of the war as a partially or not-fully-mobilized 'patriotic war'. But of 'revolutionary' or 'popular' overtones in a Marxist sense, there were none at all. A companion volume to this book, one which will describe the course of the Rif War, has been promised, but Ayache and I see 'Abd al-Krim and the Rifians through opposite ends of the telescope, and it seems to me that this is the way it will remain.

NOTES

1. Cf. Especially my book *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: An Ethnography and History*, (Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology No.55), Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976, and my edited and annotated translation *Emilio Blanco Izaga: Colonel in the Rif*, (Ethnography Series, HRAFlex Books MX3-001), 2 vols., New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1975.
2. I would call attention here both to my book, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif* (1976) and to my article 'Segmentary Systems and the Role of "Five Fifths" in Tribal Morocco', *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée*, III, 1, 1967, pp.65-95, republished in A.S.Ahmed and D.M. Hart, Eds., *Islam in Tribal Societies: From the Atlas to the Indus*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983, pp.66-105.

GARRUCHA, ALMERIA, SPAIN

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A CHANGING IMAGE: AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE. By RICHARD H. CURTISS. Washing D.C., American Educational Trust, 1982.

THE BATTLE OF BEIRUT: WHY ISRAEL INVADED LEBANON. By MICHAEL JENSEN. London, Zed Press, 1982.

FIRE OF ISLAM. By DESMOND MEIRING. London, Wildwood House, 1982.

Between them these three books cover some of the most contentious issues in the Middle East today, ranging from a study of the complex issues behind American policy towards Israel, through the circumstances surrounding the invasion of Lebanon last year, to the consequences of the Arab-Israeli conflict within Egypt as manifested in the assassination of Sadat and the growth of Fundamentalism. That they should appear so closely together indicates the renewed importance and interest shown in these underlying themes in Middle Eastern affairs. Even more striking